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Introduction
In many cases regulation and standards are introduced when preferences change (e.g. regarding social issues), environmental conditions change (e.g. climate change) or when new technologies become available (e.g. nuclear energy, genetic modification (GM)).
These changes induce new policy questions to either allow (approve) new technologies or not; to try to change behavior in response of environmental and social concerns, or not.
There are major differences in technology regulation among countries, reflected in the abundance of differences in labor standards, food safety and quality standards, environmental standards, etc. A particular case is the difference in GM technology regulation between the EU and the US. Since the end of the 1990s, EU legislation has put a de facto moratorium on the approval of GM products whereas the US has chosen to rely on pre-existing laws considering GM products as substantially equivalent to conventional ones (Sheldon 2002) . This difference has traditionally been attributed to either differences in consumer preferences, or to trade protectionist motives. Neither of these arguments provides a satisfactory explanation -at least not in isolation -and lacks a dynamic perspective.
The 'different consumer preferences' argument advances that European consumers are more risk averse and concerned with food safety, and therefore distrust biotechnology more, whereas US consumers are indifferent toward GM products (Curtis et al. 2004 ). However, according to Paarlberg (2008) , consumers on both sides of the Atlantic tend to dislike GM technology. Additionally, this difference in EU and US consumer preferences is not evident from a historical perspective either. There has been an important shift in the difference between consumer and environmental protection policies in the EU and US, as illustrated by Vogel (2003) 
: "[f]rom the 1960s through the mid 1980s American regulatory standards tended to be more stringent, comprehensive and innovative than in either individual European countries or in the EU. However, since around 1990 the obverse has been true; many important EU consumer and environmental regulations are now more precautionary than their
American counterparts." Moreover, surveys on consumer attitudes with respect to biotechnology that illustrate these differences in consumer preferences are endogenous to GM regulation. In countries where GM products are available consumer preferences may shift in favor of this technology, while inversely consumers may distrust GM technology more in countries where GM products have been banned.
A related argument is that European consumers have only limited confidence in national public bodies. Trust in regulatory authorities is significantly higher in the US than in Europe, which is said to explain why citizens' demands for GM regulation are stronger in Europe (Gaskell et al. 1999; Nelson 2001) . However, this would -somewhat paradoxically -imply that European consumers demand more regulation from authorities in which they have lower trust.
A second argument focuses on the interests of the agrochemical and seed industry, and farmers. Biotechnology regulation is said to support agrochemical companies, either by creating higher returns on investment in biotechnology or by protecting against the comparative disadvantage from not investing in biotechnology (Graff and Zilberman 2004) . In this view, the European ban of GM products serves as a protectionist non-tariff barrier to trade (Lapan and Moschini 2004) , and protects the European agrochemical firms who are dominant in the traditional crop-protection market (Anderson and Jackson 2006; Graff and Zilberman 2007) . Additionally, Anderson et al. (2004) argue that EU farmers lobby in favor of GM regulation because farmers in countries such as the US and Brazil have a comparative advantage applying biotechnology. Therefore, it is argued, it is rational for EU farmers to support regulation that restricts the use of biotechnology. However, EU farmers were initially less opposed to GM technology according to Bernauer (2003) , and US and EU GM regulations were initially moving in the same direction (Vogel 2001) . These observations seem to contradict the static trade protection argument.
There exists an extensive literature on the welfare effects of biotechnology and biotechnology regulation. The effect of efficiency-enhancing biotechnology on social welfare depends crucially on the extent of consumer aversion to GM products (Moschini 2008) . 1 Studies also show that the welfare effects of biotechnology regulation are complex. Lapan and Moschini (2004) and Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006) show that the welfare effects of GM regulation depend on consumer preferences, segregation 1 The early literature ignored this potential consumer aversion and estimated the welfare impact of biotechnology innovations measuring traditional consumer and producer surpluses (Alston et al. 1995) . Even when accounting for market power of innovating biotechnology companies (Moschini and Lapan 1997) , studies found considerable welfare gains from the introduction of new GM products (FalckZepeda et al. 2000) that were shared among consumers, farmers, and agro-chemical innovators (Moschini et al. 2000) . Recent studies which integrate consumer aversion to GM products find that the welfare impact of biotechnology is ambiguous (Fulton and Giannakas 2004; Lapan and Moschini 2004; Lence and Hayes 2005; Sobolevsky et al. 2005). costs, efficiency gains by the GM technology, and the market power of the innovating companies. Fulton and Giannakas (2004) demonstrate that the introduction of GM products and the regulation of biotechnology may have different welfare effects on different groups in society -such as consumers, farmers, seed companies, and innovating life science companies. This inherent rent distribution may induce different preferences for biotechnology regulation and conflicting pressures on governments which demands a political economy analysis (Josling et al. 2003) .
Therefore, building on our previous work on the political economy of standards and regulation (Swinnen and Vandemoortele 2008; 2009a; 2009b) , this paper develops a general and dynamic political economy model of technology regulation. Our framework allows to combine both arguments of differences in consumer preferences and producer protectionism to provide a more nuanced explanation for the different biotechnology regulations in the EU and the US, and why this difference may persist.
First, our formal model shows that there exists a critical level of consumer preferences below which no technology regulation is imposed. Hence small variations in consumer preferences may determine whether a country imposes technology regulation or not. If consumer preferences are identical between countries and constant over time, countries adopt the same technology regulation and stick to the status quo independent of which technology regulation was initially imposed.
Second, when consumer preferences are different between countries and constant over time, different technology regulations may be imposed, and these differences may persist because of changing producer interests. If a government chooses to allow a technology, it continues to allow that technology independent of what the other government decides. If a government however chooses to ban that technology, it may continue to do so in the long run depending on the relative impacts of both regulatory options on consumers and producers, and their political power. A larger political power of producers leads to a larger range of situations where the technology is banned in the long run, even though consumers prefer allowing it. In these situations producer interests are translated into policy persistence.
Third, we show that even a temporary difference in consumer preferences between countries, a 'butterfly', may create a difference in technology regulation that may persist after the difference in consumer preferences has disappeared. We show that this hysteresis 2 in technology regulation is driven by producer protectionist motives.
Our work is related to several other papers on hysteresis in socio-economic behavior and policy. For example, Dixit (1989a) shows that output price uncertainty leads to investment hysteresis for certain ranges of entry and exit costs, and Dixit (1989b) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) demonstrate that exchange rate fluctuations create similar hysteresis in firms' export decisions. Hysteresis is also shown to exist in labor markets where firing and hiring costs lead to persistence in unemployment (e.g. Lindbeck and Snower 1986; Belke and Göcke 1999) . Our model is different from these contributions, both in the source of variation (small consumer preference variations) that triggers technology investment (or not), and in the hysteresis effect (persistence in technology regulation due to producer protectionism).
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Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 advances a general and dynamic political economy model of technology regulation. Sections 3, 4, and 5 apply this model to three different cases. In the first case (Section 3), consumer preferences are identical 2 Hysteresis is defined as "permanent effects of a temporary stimulus" (Göcke 2002 ) and originates from physics and magnetism (Cross and Allan 1988) . See Göcke (2002) for an overview of various concepts of hysteresis as applied in economics.
3 Our paper is also linked to research on path-dependence in technical standards and technical lock-in by historical events (Arthur 1989) . This type of lock-in is driven by network externalities, increasing returns to adoption, or learning by doing. See e.g. David 1985; Farrell and Saloner 1985; Cowan 1990; Puffert 2002 for some historical cases. between countries and constant over time. In the second case (Section 4), consumer preferences are different between countries and constant over time. In the third case (Section 5 -the 'butterfly' case), consumer preferences are only temporarily different between countries. Section 6 discusses the implications of our model, and Section 7 extends the model in several directions. Section 8 concludes.
The Political Economy of Technology Regulation: A Dynamic Model
Assume two identical open economies , k A B = , with between them symmetric transportation costs (which could be small, but positive). In both countries we consider the same sector in which one product is produced and consumed. Two production technologies can be applied to create this product. The technologies differ in their costefficiency, and consumers have some aversion to the 'cheap' technology. All consumers rank products manufactured with the cheap technology as being of lower quality than products produced with the 'expensive' technology, but are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for this quality difference. One example is child labor -which is cheap -but consumers object to its use. Another example is the installation of expensive catalytic converters that, as preferred by consumers, reduce carbon dioxide emissions. A last example is conventional farming that uses non-GM seed versus biotechnology that applies GM seed. Using biotechnology is cheaper (Falck-Zepeda et al. 2000; Lapan and Moschini 2007) , but consumers have some aversion to GM products (Curtis et al. 2004) .
Technology Regulation and Standards
In every period 1, 2 t = , each country k 's government has to decide whether to approve the cheap technology or not by setting a standard All domestic producers have to comply with the standard -whether they produce for the home or foreign market -and equally all foreign producers who export to this country. 4 We assume that only the government can guarantee consumers that a good has been produced with the expensive technology. 5 We abstract from government enforcement or credibility issues in the implementation of the regulation.
Producers
We assume that production is a function of a sector-specific input factor that is available in inelastic supply. All profits made in the sector accrue to this specific factor. There are at least two firms active in each country, and firms compete on prices. Aggregate producer profits at time t in country k are Grossman and Helpman (1994) . This labor income ensures that producers' welfare is positive and their lobbying contributions credible.
(1977), Dixit (1980) and Dong and Saha (1998) , we use a specific form for the cost function:
where a and b are positive parameters. The first term, ( ) Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980) , which depends on the current and previous periods' regulations. All other production costs are normalized to zero. 
Consumers
We impose a vertical differentiation representation of heterogeneous consumer preferences based on Spence (1976) , Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Tirole (1988) . The underlying assumption is that if products with both technologies were available at the same price, all consumers would choose the high standard product. Individuals in country k and period t consume at most one unit of the good and their preferences are described by the following utility function:
if consumer buys the good with standard at price = 0 if consumer does not buy,
where i φ is consumer i 's preference parameter. 
The number of consumers k t N is constant over time and identical between countries, i.e.
is presumed to be positive at market equilibrium. Consumer surplus in country k at
. 2
8 Our approach of modeling standards is common in the literature on vertical differentiation and GM technology (see for example Fulton and Giannakas 2004; Moschini et al. 2008 ) and consistent with the standard approach in the literature on minimum quality standards (see e.g. Ronnen 1991 , Jeanneret and Verdier 1996 , Valletti 2000 .
The Government
The government maximizes a weighted sum of contributions from interest groups and social welfare as in Grossman and Helpman (1994; . Social welfare
W s is defined as the sum of producer profits and consumer surplus:
Interest groups offer contributions to the government conditional on the policy choices made by the government. For simplicity, we assume that only producers are politically organized, and that an interest group cannot contribute to a foreign government. 9 The government's objective function,
where ( )
C s is the 'truthful' 10 contribution scheme of the producers' interest group;
and α represents its relative lobbying strength. Because the government's regulatory choice is dichotomous, this 'truthful' contribution function need only to comprise two numbers (see Grossman and Helpman 1995) , i.e. the contributions associated with allowing the cheap technology,
We therefore define the 'truthful' contribution function of the producers' interest group as
Time Framework
Each period consists of several sequential moves which take place simultaneously in both countries. At the beginning of each period, agents take stock of the existing technologies. The producers' interest group then proposes its contribution scheme to the government that chooses the standard. We assume that none of the agents takes future periods into consideration when making their decisions, i.e. they have a 'myopic planning horizon' (Göcke 2002) . Upon the policy selection, producers make the necessary investment if the level of the standard has been altered between periods.
Finally, the product(s) are produced and sold, and the producers' interest group makes its political contribution.
A government maintains the existing standard if and only if
or equivalently, if
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that only the expensive technology is available before period 1, and that therefore, by default, governments set their standard these preferences are constant over time; (ii) with different consumer preferences between countries and preferences constant over time; and (iii) with a temporary difference in consumer preferences (the 'butterfly').
Case (i): Constant and Identical Consumer Preferences between Countries
Consider the case where consumers in both countries have identical preferences,
Under our assumptions, both countries are identical and with Bertrand competition and positive trade costs, there is no international trade. Thus, it suffices to look at one country.
Period 1
The cheap technology becomes available in both countries. Prohibiting its use
requires investment to switch between regulations and the marginal cost is 
Hence, producers are indifferent to the level of the standard in period 1.
Since price equals marginal cost, consumer surplus
Consumers prefer to ban the cheap technology if
where , 1 c k φ is the consumers' critical preference value in country k and period 1. 13 In other words, the consumers' critical preference value is the level of consumer preferences below which they prefer allowing the cheap technology.
As producers are indifferent, the government follows consumers' interests and the government's critical preference value , 1 g k φ coincides with the consumers' one.
Thus, the government prohibits the cheap technology if and only if
Result 1: With L bs a > Δ and 1
= :
Result 1 implies that, given equal consumer preferences between countries, a critical This is intuitive: for larger b the additional 'cost of quality' of producing with the expensive technology is larger, so consumers pay relatively more for the high quality product. Thus consumer preferences need to be larger to support the prohibition of the cheap technology, which is reflected in a larger
A higher 'investment cost' of switching between regulations, represented by a larger value for a , reduces the government's critical preference value
With higher adjustment costs, consumers pay relatively more for the low quality product and are thus less in favor of allowing the cheap technology. This is represented by a lower critical preference value , 1 g k φ and thus a smaller range of 1
Period 2
The analysis of the political equilibrium in period 2 depends on the outcome in period 1, 
Comparing Equations (11) and (12) , :
As summarized in Result 2, our dynamic political economy model shows that, if consumer preferences are identical between countries and constant over time, governments impose the same regulation in each period. Moreover, Result 2 shows that once a government has imposed a certain regulation while both technologies are available, it endorses the status quo. Result 2 also implies that minor differences in consumer preferences can lead to different technology regulations which persist over time.
Case (ii): Constant and Different Consumer Preferences between Countries
Without loss of generality, we assume that country A 's consumers have higher preferences for quality than country B 's consumers. Preferences remain constant over
Period 1 The analysis of the political equilibrium in period 1 is similar to that of case (i). The cheap technology becomes available in both countries. Prohibiting that technology results in a marginal cost of ( ) ( ) Since the default situation is the same as in case (i) for both countries, the consumers' critical preference value , 1 c k φ is given by Equation (10) 
Period 2
Given the outcome in period 1, the countries begin period 2 with different regulations, φ , is then given by Equation (12) which is higher than in period 1 (Equation (10) 
Comparing Equations (13) and (10) 
Comparing values (16) and (10) As a result, it is optimal for country A 's government to set 2 A H s s = since country A 's producers also endorse the status quo.
In the second situation, this change in consumers' interests is that in period 2 the low quality good can be imported from country B at a lower price than in period 1 when it was still more expensive due to the investment cost. In this situation, a coalition switch takes place between period 1 and 2, since both producer interests (from being indifferent to favoring H s ) and consumer interests (from favoring H s to favoring L s ) change.
Which regulation is then optimal for country A 's government depends on the relative differences in producer profits and consumer surpluses between the two regulatory options, and the relative weight of producers' contributions in the government's objective function ( ) α . Inserting Equations (14) and (15) into Equations (6) and (7) gives
Observe that the second and third term of Equation (17) together are identical to Equation (15) 
Combining these three findings, it follows that
This inequality implies that for a certain range of consumer preferences, 
We find by the implicit function theorem and using Equations (18) and (20) that
Equation (21) implies that the government's critical preference value, 
Our dynamic political economy model shows that differences in consumer preferences between countries may lead to differences in technology regulation. These differences may persist over time, however not because of the differences in consumer preferences but for reasons of producer protectionism. This is driven by the investment cost that induces producers in both countries to switch from being indifferent in the first period to supporting the status quo in the second period. If a government chooses to allow the cheap technology, it prefers a regulatory status quo no matter what the other government decides. If a government chooses to ban the cheap technology, it will prefer the regulatory status quo depending on the relative impacts on consumers and producers of both regulatory options, and the political power of the producers' interest group. A larger political power of the producers' interest group leads to a larger range of circumstances where the status quo is maintained, even though consumers oppose it.
Different technology regulations are initiated by differences in consumer preferences, but persistence in these regulatory differences is motivated by producers' interests.
Case (iii): A Temporary Difference in Consumer Preferences
In this section, we show that even if the difference in consumer preferences is only temporary and potentially small (a 'butterfly'), hysteresis in technology regulation and long-lasting regulatory differences may emerge between countries. To this end, we assume that consumer preferences are different between countries in period 1 but identical in period 2. There are two potential scenarios. In the first scenario, country Table 1 summarizes the first scenario.
This scenario shows that if the producers' interest group in country A has sufficient political power, both countries remain having different technology regulations, even though consumer preferences are identical. The 'butterfly', the temporary difference in consumer preferences, triggers different initial regulatory choices and investment which lead to a coalition switch in country A as consumer and producer interests change. Country A 's producers lobby successfully to uphold the status quo in period 2 which protects them from cheaper imports, while consumers prefer the cheap technology. Hence the temporary difference in consumer preferences leads to initial differences in regulation, but it are the producer protectionist motives that cause hysteresis and long-lasting differences in technology regulation.
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In Figure 1 we illustrate the interests of country A 's producers in upholding the status quo where for simplicity world demand is assumed constant and equal to 1. The default situation is that initially only the expensive technology is available, i.e. Equations (10) and (16) (18) to (21)). 18 Since we assumed in the previous cases that persists although consumer preferences are identical. The temporary difference in consumer preferences triggers different regulatory choices and investment in period 1.
Because country A 's producers gain a first-mover advantage by not switching technologies in the first period, they produce in period 2 at a lower marginal cost with the expensive technology. By lobbying to uphold the status quo in technology regulation, country B 's producers protect themselves from this competitive disadvantage. Hence also in the second scenario, the temporary difference in consumer preferences leads to different initial regulations, but it is again a producer protectionist motive that causes hysteresis in technology regulation and long-lasting differences in regulation between countries.
In conclusion, our dynamic political economy model shows that in the second period producers in both countries favor technology regulation that excludes foreign imports, due to technology-specific investments (or the absence of these investments) that were triggered by a temporary difference in consumer preferences in the first period. The model shows that policy persistence in (differences in) technology regulation may occur because governments cater domestic producers' interests, creating hysteresis in technology regulation.
Discussion and Implications
Our model indicates that both consumer preferences and protectionist motives play an important role in (differences in) technology regulation. We now apply the insights from our model to explain the difference in biotechnology regulation between the US and EU.
The food scares that plagued Europe in the second half of the 1990s, such as the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, commonly known as the 'mad cow' disease), the food and mouth disease (FMD) and dioxin crises triggered (temporarily) higher consumer preferences for quality and safety in Europe (Bernauer 2003; Vogel 2003; Graff and Zilberman 2007; Scholderer 2005) . In line with case (ii) for permanently higher European consumer preferences, or with the first scenario of case (iii) for temporarily higher European consumer preferences, these differences induced different initial GM regulations and investments in the US and Europe. The US allowed GM technology (country B ) and the EU de facto prohibited it (country A ). Because of these different initial regulations producers' interests changed: US producers became supporters of GM technology, while European producers became opponents. By lobbying the government to protect their home markets, producers obtained the status quo and created hysteresis in biotechnology regulation. Hence the producers' interests are the reason that the differences in GM regulation persist, if the difference in preferences is permanent (case (ii)) or temporary (scenario 1 of case (iii)). This argument is supported by Graff and Zilberman (2004) who argue that GM regulation in name of consumer interests may equally support agrochemical companies and farmers by protecting against the comparative disadvantage from either investing or not investing in GM technology. It are thus differences in consumer preferences that created initial differences in GM regulation, but producer interests that lead to hysteresis in GM regulation. This is also consistent with the fact that, before the food safety crises, European producers were less opposed to GM technology (Bernauer 2003) and that initially EU and US GM regulations were on the same track (Vogel 2001) .
The main cause of this regulatory hysteresis is that producers incur a cost of switching between different technologies. This is in line with Coate and Morris (1999) who argue that "It is clear that the phenomena of [policy] persistence is driven by the existence of switching costs which drive a wedge between the firm's willingness to pay for the policy […] .". The important implication is that to change biotechnology regulation in Europe, one needs to ensure that European producers have the possibility to adjust their production technology without losing profits to foreign imports. This fits well some of the recent German regulations on biotechnology. Germany allows cultivation of the 'Amflora' potato, a GM crop developed by the German chemicals group BASF while at the same time Germany bans cultivation and sale of GM maize (MON 810) produced by the US company Monsanto, despite the fact that both crops have been approved for cultivation at EU level. This suggests that Germany is providing time for its producers to switch between conventional and GM technology without loosing market share to foreign imports.
If it are instead the US consumer preferences that are temporarily lower, the second scenario of case (iii) explains the different GM regulation in the US and EU. In this view, temporarily lower US consumer preferences triggered differences in initial GM regulation. However US producers' interests are then the reason that differences in biotechnology regulation persist even if there is no longer a difference in consumer preferences. If the US producers' interest group has sufficient political power, they succeed in obtaining the regulatory status quo, which allows using GM technology. Charles (2001) also argues that the Reagan administration was very much opposed to additional regulations, and according to Stewart et al. (2002) the Bush administration explicitly decided to push for GM technology. These factors put higher political weight on producers' interests in the US which, according to our model, leads to a continuation of the approval of GM technology in the US, even if US consumers would oppose it, and causes regulatory hysteresis.
Extensions of the Model
It is possible to extend our model in several directions -we merely indicate some of them, where possible in application to GM technology. First, we have assumed that consumer preferences in the second period are independent from regulation in the first period, i.e. that ( ) (Just and Hueth 1993) . Seed companies may prefer to restrict GM technology or not, depending on how much market power the biotechnology firms have and how much the seed companies' margins are squeezed by the biotechnology companies. Additionally, GM regulation may entail further costs on seed companies such as segregation costs (Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2007) . Similarly, farmers may oppose or favor GM regulation, depending on the impact on input and output prices and whether they incur extra costs (Veyssiere and Giannakas 2006) . Depending on how these different agents in the supply chain interact, the distribution of market power in the supply chain, and the political power of the different agents, different outcomes may result. Separating out these different interest groups substantially complicates the analysis and is left for future research.
Finally, we have assumed that technology regulation is a one-dimensional and dichotomous standard, while in reality governments have a broad range of policy instruments at their disposal. For example, we have not allowed for labeling policies that would give consumers the opportunity to choose (see e.g. Golan et al. 2001; Fulton and Giannakas 2004; Moschini 2008 ). In the case of GM technology, governments may also impose maximum contamination levels. Biotechnology regulation may also distinguish between GM technology that is used for animal feed, or food for human consumption. Of course, all these different regulations may have different effects on different actors in the market, and interest groups who oppose GM regulation may still prefer one type of regulation over another.
Conclusions
Our paper advances a dynamic political-economic model of regulation, in which two countries' governments need to decide which of two technologies to allow in each of two periods. One technology allows to produce at lower marginal cost, but consumers have some (heterogeneous) aversion to it. Switching between technologies involves a one-time marginal cost increase. First we have shown the existence of a critical (consumer) preference value above which the cheap technology is prohibited. A small variation in consumer preferences may thus determine whether a country bans a technology or not.
Second, the dynamic model showed that if consumer preferences are constant and identical between countries, countries adopt the same technology regulation and stick to the status quo independent of the initial technology regulation.
Third, constant but different consumer preferences between countries may lead to different technology regulations in the first period, depending on how the countries' consumer preferences are positioned with respect to the critical value. If different technologies are adopted in the first period, the government that initally allows the cheap technology always endorses the status quo in the long run, independent of the other country's regulation. The government that initially prohibits the cheap technology may also support the status quo because producers' interests switch around, even though consumers may wish to change. Producers are initially indifferent but because of the switching cost they suffer a competitive disadvantage in applying the cheap technology. Therefore they lobby to maintain the ban on the cheap technology to protect themselves from cheaper imports from the country that adopts the cheap technology, and succeed if their political power is sufficiently strong.
Hence producer lobbying, not consumer preferences, leads to policy persistence and long-run differences in technology regulation.
Fourth, the previous results may also hold when the difference in consumer preferences is only temporary. A temporary difference in consumer preferences may trigger different initial regulations, and thus different investments. In the next period, producers in both countries favor technology regulation that excludes foreign imports, due to technology-specific investments (or the absence of these). Hence, despite identical consumer preferences in the long run, regulatory differences may be longlasting because governments respond to pressures of domestic producers, creating hysteresis in technology regulation. We have demonstrated that similar results may be obtained from temporary differences in company strategies that result in different investment costs.
This model illustrates that both consumer preferences and protectionist motives play an important role in explaining the differences in GM technology regulation between the EU and US. Higher consumer preferences for regulation in Europe due to food safety crises triggered differences in initial GM regulation.
However the domestic producer interests, in Europe and the US, are the reason that differences in biotechnology regulation persist even if there is no longer a difference in consumer preferences. By contributing to the government to protect their home markets, European as well as US producers create hysteresis in biotechnology regulation and long-lasting regulatory differences.
The main cause of this regulatory persistence is the cost of switching between different technologies. In order to induce a change in technology regulation one needs to ensure that producers can adjust their production technology without losing profits to foreign imports. This reduces producers' incentives to lobby in favor of a status quo in technology regulation, and would remove differences in regulation between countries, all else equal. Tables   Table 1: 
